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 1. INTRODUCTION
Consider two thematic clubs o⁄ering each a di⁄erentiated service to its
members, as it would be the case, for instance, of a jazz club or a ca⁄ee
proposing philosophical forums. Such clubs create opportunities for their
members to listen to jazz music (or discuss philosophy). They also serve
to generate social networks, facilitating interactions among club members.
Generally, both these services are positively valued by their members.
In this paper, we wish to raise the following question. Assume that
the size of the population of jazz music fans is very large compared with
the philosophers￿population size. Are there any circumstances in which
philosophical forums would purely and simply disappear because of the
supremacy of social network externalities over the individual preferences
for the themes patronized by the clubs?
Similar questions might arise in many other contexts. For instance, this
is often the case when choosing a speci￿c career among the di⁄erent diplo-
mas o⁄ered by a university. In some circumstances, even when individuals
are particularly interested in a given scienti￿c or professional area, they
might be diverted from it when the number of people working in this area
is not su¢ ciently large to generate social recognition of the ￿eld. When
many individuals share these expectations and all of them su¢ ciently value
social recognition, that diploma might purely and simply disappear from
academic programs in favour of alternative and more fashionable ￿elds.
Figure 1 shows the evolution from 1998 to 2005 of % of European (EU-
27) 3rd cycle students choosing between the diploma in Business and Ad-
ministration versus Mathematics and Statistics. This ￿gure, even if fo-
cusing on two diplomas only, points out a huge asymmetry between the
number of students who choose Mathematics and Statistics vs Business
and Administration (e.g., in 1998, only 8.9% of the students have chosen
the former diploma, while 91,1% have preferred the latter). Moreover, it
also illustrates that this asymmetry is progressively growing over time (e.g.,
in 2005, only 7,2% of the students have chosen Mathematics and Statistics,
which means that in 7 years, the relative importance of Mathematics and
Statistics Diploma has decreased 19 percentage points!). As we argued be-
fore, the existence of positive network externalities might explain (at least
partially) this evolution.
At a smaller scale, a similar phenomenon has been observed in eco-
nomics departments, particularly, with courses in general equilibrium the-
ory which were so fashionable in the seventies. Nowadays they have disap-
peared from most departments￿programs where they have been replaced by
more fashionable courses, like courses in game theory or neuroeconomics.
These and many other similar examples point out the problem of the
minorities￿survival in the presence of positive network externalities. In













































































ef34 Business and administration ef46 Mathematics and statistics
FIG. 1 :% of 3rd cycle students in ef34 and ef46 (Source: Eurostat)
in which circumstances such survival problems might appear, ￿rst consid-
ering the case of simple network externalities and then the case of cross
network externalities. Simple network externalities take place when indi-
viduals￿ utility for a given activity depends not only on its intrinsic nature,
but also on the number of individuals sharing the same activity. This is
typically the case with thematic clubs, whose members are generally inter-
ested in the theme of the club but also in the social interactions that the
club generates. Similarly, the notion of cross network externalities arises
when the utility of individuals of a given category depends not only on its
intrinsic nature, but also on the number of individuals of another category
who share the same activity, and vice-versa. For instance, in the case of
clubs, these categories could be men and women.While individuals in both
categories value the speci￿c activity o⁄ered by the club, they only value
social interactions when those take place with the opposite sex.
The example of clubs has been chosen with an illustrative purpose only.
We suggest in this paper that the supremacy of network externalities over
individual preferences can be viewed as a broader phenomenon, arising in a
wide range of human activities. Therefore, when the supremacy e⁄ect takes
place, some of these human activities might purely and simply disappear
in a quasi-irreversible way. In this case, we suggest that there might be an
intertemporal inconsistency between the interest of today￿ s agents and the
diversity of choice made available to future generations.
In the following sections, we provide a formal model where it is possible
to identify the necessary and su¢ cient conditions guaranteeing the survival
of the club o⁄ering the service in line with the preferences of the minority
group. In section 2, we start by considering the case of simple network
externalities, while cross network externalities are examined in section 3.
3Finally, section 4 sets up the main conclusions.
2. SIMPLE NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
We start by setting the basic model in which simple network external-
ities are analyzed. To this end, consider two di⁄erentiated clubs (club 1
and 2); each of them generating simple network externalities. The universe
of individuals is divided into two distinct populations. A fraction ￿1 of the
total population (population 1) prefers the activity o⁄ered by club 1, while
the other fraction, ￿2 (population 2) prefers the activity o⁄ered by club 2,
with ￿1 + ￿2 = 1:
Individuals in each population do not value equally the speci￿c activity
proposed by their intrinsically preferred club, while on the contrary, all of
them are identical in terms of the bene￿t they get from social interactions.
More precisely, we denote by U1j;t(m) the utility obtained by an individual
m who belongs to population 1 and attends club j, j = 1;2; at period t :
U11;t(m) = m + ￿N1;t￿1;
U12;t(m) = ￿N2;t￿1;
where m is uniformly distributed on the interval [0;1] and corresponds to
the bene￿t obtained from the activity in club j: As for the term ￿Nj;t￿1;
it corresponds to the bene￿t obtained from social interactions among the
members in club j (￿ > 0 represents the intensity of the network external-
ities). Analogously, the utility of an individual m in population 2 is given
by
U21;t(m) = ￿N1;t￿1;
U22;t(m) = m + ￿N2;t￿1:
Network externalities are assumed to be perceived by individuals with a
time lag of one period. Accordingly, at period 0; each individual chooses
his/her club only according to his/her preferences over the services rendered
by each club. Therefore, N1;0 = ￿1 and N2;0 = ￿2: Assume also that, at
period 0, the two populations have asymmetric sizes - say, without loss of
generality, ￿1 > ￿2. Then, at period 0, club 1 constitutes a larger network
than club 2 (N1;0 > N2;0) and, everything else being the same, club 1
becomes more attractive for individuals in population 1; but as well for
individuals in population 2: Consider the individual m0 in population 2 for
whom the equality
￿N1;0 = m0 + ￿N2;0
holds. For this individual; the network bene￿t from attending club 1 in-
stead of club 2, ￿(N1;0 ￿ N2;0); exactly o⁄sets the opportunity cost of not
participating in his/her preferred activity (m0). Therefore, at period 1;
4some individuals of population 2 decide to switch to club 1 and the size of
the network of this club increases from N1;0 to N1;1 as given by
N1;1 = N1;0 + m0N2;0;
= ￿1 + ￿(N1;0 ￿ N2;0)￿2:
At the end of period 1; the network of club 1 is reinforced, and this club
becomes even more attractive to individuals in both populations. Once
more, club 1 attracts new individuals from population 2 and reinforces the
size of its network again, and so on. More generally, at period t+1; network
sizes are given by
N1;t+1 = ￿1 + ￿(N1;t ￿ N2;t)￿2 (1)
and
N2;t+1 = 1 ￿ N1;t+1: (2)
Incorporating equation (2) into equation (1), the network size of club 1 at
period t + 1 may be re-written as
N1;t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿￿2 + 2￿￿2N1;t;
which corresponds to a ￿rst order linear di⁄erence equation whose general
solution is given by
N1;t =







As for the network size of club 2 at period t; it is simply given by
N2;t = 1 ￿ N1;t: (4)
As shown in the next proposition, the survival of both clubs in the long
run occurs if and only if the valuation of social interactions by the potential
clubs￿members is not too signi￿cant.
Proposition 1. Both clubs survive in the long run with strictly positive
memberships if and only if
￿ < 1: (5)
Proof. From equation (3), convergence occurs whenever 2￿￿2 < 1:
Whenever this is the case, in order to guarantee that both clubs have
strictly positive memberships, the steady state market share of club 1
(N￿
1 = limt!1 N1;t) must be strictly smaller than 1: This is equivalent
to
1 ￿ (￿ + 1)￿2
1 ￿ 2￿￿2
< 1 () ￿ < 1:
5When the survival condition is not met, the activity proposed by the
club which is intrinsically the most preferred by the minority irremediably
disappears due to the supremacy of network externalities. As shown in
the following proposition, the date of elimination depends not only on the
intensity of network externalities but also on the relative sizes of the initial
populations.
Proposition 2. When the "survival condition" (5)is violated, the mi-










In the next section, we move a step further and consider the case of
cross network externalities.
3. CROSS NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
Asssume the same situation as before, but now the members of a club
value social interactions only when they take place with members of the
opposite sex. This is often the case because individuals frequently go to
clubs not only to share common interests with other members, but also to
get some "amorous rendez-vous"! In such circumstances, each club o⁄ers
a speci￿c service but also serves as a platform embarking two categories of
members: men and women.
With cross network externalities, the situation is accordingly more com-
plex than under simple network externalities. In the latter case, there are
only two categories of agents : those who prefer philosophy to jazz and
those who prefer jazz to philosophy (regardless of the sex of the member-
ship). In the former case, there are in fact four categories: women (men)
who prefer jazz to philosophy and women (men) who prefer philosophy to
jazz.
We consider two di⁄erentiated clubs (platforms), say club 1 and 2;
interacting simultaneously with two categories of members: women (W)
and men (M): Each of those categories can be subdivided according to
their preferences over the activity developed in each club. Accordingly,
we must consider two sub-populations of women (population 1 and popu-
lation 2) and two sub-populations of men. In the side of women, ￿1 and
￿2 (￿1 + ￿2 = 1) represent the mass of women in sub-populations 1 and
2, respectively. Analogously, in the men￿side, ￿1 and ￿2 (￿1 + ￿2 = 1)
represent the mass of men in sub-populations 1 and 2, respectively.
In the women￿side, the utility obtained by the woman v that belongs
6to sub population 1 and attends club j (j = 1;2) at period t is given by
UW





where v is uniformly distributed on the interval [0;1] and corresponds to
the bene￿t obtained by this woman from the activity in club j: As for
the term ￿NM
j;t￿1;it corresponds to the bene￿t from social interaction with
men attending the same club (￿ > 0 represents the intensity of the network






22;t(v) = v + ￿NM
2;t:
By symmetry, in the men￿side, the utility obtained by the man k that
belongs to sub population 1 and attends club j (j = 1;2) at period t is
given by
UM





where k is uniformly distributed on the interval [0;1] and corresponds to
the bene￿t obtained by this man from the activity in club j: As for the
term ￿NW
j;t￿1;it corresponds to the bene￿t from social interaction with
women attending the same club (￿ > 0 represents the intensity of the
network externalities).





22;t(k) = k + ￿NW
2;t￿1:
At period 0;all individuals in both categories choose to attend their
most intrinsically preferred club, i.e., NW
1;0 = ￿1; NW
2;0 = ￿2; NM
1;0 = ￿1 and
NM
2;0 = ￿2. We assume : ￿1 > ￿2 and ￿1 > ￿2:
At period 0; club 1 attracts a larger male membership (given ￿1 > ￿2)
which, everything else the same, makes this club more attractive to women
in population 1 but also to women in population 2: As a result, the woman








7Consequently, at period 1, the number of women attending club 1 and
2 are now given by:
NW





2;1 = (1 ￿ ￿(NM
1;0 ￿ NM
2;0))￿2
= 1 ￿ NW
1;1;
respectively.
More generally, at period t; the female membership￿sizes corresponding
to club 1 and 2 are given by
NW





2;t = 1 ￿ NW
1;t: (13)
By analogy, it is easy to derive the male membership￿sizes correspond-
ing to club 1 and 2 at period t + 1; as
NM





2;t = 1 ￿ NM
1;t: (15)
Applying equations (14) and (15), with t = t ￿ 1; we compute NM
1;t￿1
and NM
2;t￿1; respectively. Then, we substitute these values in equation (12)
and we obtain the female membership￿size of club 1 conditional on the
female membership two periods before, namely
NW
1;t = (￿1 + 2￿￿1￿2 ￿ 2￿￿￿2￿2 ￿ ￿￿2) + (4￿￿￿2￿2)NW
1;t￿2; (16)
which corresponds to a second order linear di⁄erence equation and deter-


































2 (when t is odd), (18)
with
B = ￿1 + 2￿￿1￿2 ￿ 2￿￿￿2￿2 ￿ ￿￿2 (19)
A = 4￿￿￿2￿2: (20)
8The same analysis can be performed in the men￿side, where the size
of the male membership of each club can be rewritten as a second order
linear di⁄erence equation, namely
NM
1;t = (￿1 + 2￿￿1￿2 ￿ 2￿￿￿2￿2 ￿ ￿￿2) + (4￿￿￿2￿2)NM
1;t￿2: (21)



































2 (when t is odd); (23)
with A given by equation (20) and
C = ￿1 + 2￿￿1￿2 ￿ 2￿￿￿2￿2 ￿ ￿￿2: (24)
To determine the trajectories of the memberships in the case of simple
network externalities, we had simply to specify the initial membership￿sizes
at period 0: Since, in equations (16) and (21), the e⁄ectiveness of network
externalities takes a time lag of two periods, in the presence of cross network
externalities, initial conditions should now be speci￿ed over period 0 and
1: However, whenever trajectories converge, the dynamics of membership￿
sizes do not depend on the initial conditions. The next proposition identi￿es
the necessary and su¢ cient condition for convergence of female and male
membership￿sizes.





















; converge if, and only if
4￿￿￿2￿2 < 1: (25)
Proof. It follows directly from equations (17)-(18) and (22)-(23).
However, the convergence condition identi￿ed in proposition 3 is not
su¢ cient to guarantee the survival of both clubs in the long run, since the
steady state membership￿sizes of both categories must be strictly smaller
than 1:From equations (17)-(18) and (22)-(23), we compute the steady state
































































FIG. 3 :Trajectory of club 1￿ s male membership
















< 1 , ￿ <
1
2￿￿2 + (1 ￿ 2￿2)
: (29)
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the trajectories of female and male member-
ships, assuming ￿ = 0:5; ￿ = 1; ￿1 = 0:6 and ￿1 = 0:7, which means that
both conditions (28) and (29) hold.
Notice that, in the presence of cross network externalities, the survival
analysis becomes more complex and four possible outcomes can be a pri-
ori expected. First, both clubs could survive in the long run, attracting
10members of both categories (men and women). However, there are other
possibilities with survival of both clubs: a club could survive in the long
run with a single category of members (men or women). Finally, it is
also possible that the club in line with the preferences of the minority is
eliminated, and only one club survives.
The following propositions identify the necessary and su¢ cient condi-
tions for each of these alternatives to realize.
Proposition 4. Both thematic clubs (club 1 and 2) survive in the long
run with members of both categories if and only if both men and women
are not too much attracted by social interactions, namely when one of the
following conditions holds:.
(i) 0 < ￿ < 1 and ￿ <
1
2￿￿2 + (1 ￿ 2￿2)











Proposition 5. The thematic club specialized in the activity preferred
by the minority (club 2) survives in the long run with a single category
of members (men or women) if and only if that category is not too much
attracted by social interaction with the opposite sex, while the other category
is. Namely, the steady state membership of club 2 is restricted to men if
and only if








2￿￿2 + (1 ￿ 2￿2)
:
Conversely, the steady state membership of club 2 is restricted to women if
and only if one of the following condition holds:
0 < ￿ < 1 and
1









Proposition 6. The thematic club specialized in the activity preferred
by the majority (club 1) survives alone in the long run if and only if both
categories of members value social interactions wih the opposite sex su¢ -
ciently high; more precisely, when one of the following conditions holds:






(ii) ￿ > 1 and ￿ >
1
2￿￿2 + (1 ￿ 2￿2)
:
11Proof. In appendix.
The following ￿gure illustrates the above propositions, assuming ￿2 =
0:4 and ￿2 = 0:3 and representing the survival regions in the space (￿;￿)
of the preferences intensities for network externalities .



















FIG 4: Survival analysis (￿2 = 0:4 and ￿2 = 0:3):
In region A; proposition 4 holds and both women and men exhibit pref-
erences with relatively weak network intensities so that club 2 succeeds to
survive, even if it proposes a theme in line with the taste of the minority.
In regions B and D; proposition 5 holds so that club 2 is able to attract
a single category of members only. More precisely, in region B (D), men
(women) highly value the social relations with the opposite sex while, con-
versely, women (men) do not; as a result, in region B (D); the steady state
membership of the club proposing the activity preferred by the minority
(club 2) is exclusively made of women (men). Finally, in region C; club
2 does not survive at all, because both categories of members value very
highly (too highly?) the social interactions with the opposite sex.
Additionally, as a consequence of the above propositions, survival con-
ditions not only depend on the intensity of preferences for network exter-
nalities (￿ and ￿), but also on the initial asymmetry resulting from intrinsic
preferences for the themes proposed by each club (￿1 and ￿2; in the case
of women; and ￿1 and ￿2 in the case of men).In general, for given network
intensities, the higher the asymmetry in the initial dimension of the pop-
ulations (i.e., the higher ￿1 and ￿1;or equivalently, the lower ￿2 and ￿2),
12the harder it is for club 2 to survive with a "mixte" membership. One
signi￿cant exception to this statement is when both categories of members
have the same preference intensities with respect to network externalities
(￿ = ￿).In this case, it is easy to check that the outcomes identi￿ed in
proposition 5 cannot occur. More precisely, when ￿ = ￿; either both clubs
survive with mixte memberships (0 < ￿ < 1); or only the thematic club
preferred by the majority succeeds to survive (￿ > 1).
4. CONCLUSION
The example of clubs studied in the above sections emphasizes the ex-
istence of an endogenous mechanism possibly generating the permanent
disappearance of certain human activities. This phenomenon has also been
stressed in the literature on "evolution stability and societal outcomes" (see
Bowles, (2004)), exhibiting some stable equilibrium where, in the long run,
an a priori heterogeneous population specializes on a single type. This ap-
proach however is based on the e⁄ect of mismatching between members of
di⁄erent types and the resulting updates of their traits. Di⁄erently, in our
approach, the basic mechanism lies on the supremacy of network external-
ities: the disappearance of certain human activities relies on the fact that
individual preferences for the intrinsic values obtained from participating
to these activities are not su¢ ciently strong to overcome the intensity of
the network externalities they generate from period to period.
Of course, within our framework, the individuals who were initially
participating to these activities do not object against their disappearance,
since none of them is forced to choose an alternative which would di⁄er
from his/her optimal individual choice. Consequently, it cannot be argued
that the mechanism evoked above would be harmful for those who were
initially concerned.
It is important however to stress the quasi-irreversibility character re-
lated to the disappearance of such activities. When the network on which
their very existence is based, comes to vanish, only some external and
voluntary intervention could possibly reinstore the interest of individuals
for this activity. In the absence of such a voluntary intervention, younger
and future generations could be de￿nitely deprived from the opportunity
of choosing themselves whether these activities are, or are not, meaningful
to them. Furthermore, the diversity of their choice would be inexorably
reduced due to their disappearance. The reduction of diversity due to
the supremacy of network e⁄ects could eventually create a social damage
whenever focusing social values on a restricted number of alternatives only,
transforms the set of social activities and opinions into a uniform, and
perhaps boring, landscape.
The evolution of the daily press industry provides a signi￿cant example
of the possible consequences of this endogenous mechanism, known under
the name of the circulation spiral. This phenomenon has been identi￿ed by
13Furho⁄ (1973) and formally analyzed in Gabszewicz et al (2007). Accord-
ing to the circulation spiral theory, the interaction between the newspapers￿
and advertising markets drives the newspaper with the smaller readership
into a vicious circle ￿nally leading to its disappearance. The essence of
this theory rests on the positive network externalities existing between the
two markets : a larger readership attracts more advertising and again more
readers. The smaller newspaper looses readers, aggravating the problem of
selling advertising, and has ￿nally to close down. The main consequence
of the disappearance of the minority newspaper is not that some readers
have lost their preferred outlet: all of them have ￿nally agreed to switch
to the rival one, due to the larger bene￿t obtained from more informative
advertising in it. The true damage comes from the fact that, while disap-
pearing, the smaller newspaper leaves a single outlet only available to the
readership in the future. The pluralism of opinions, so important for the
spreading and survival of democracies, might have henceforth disappeared
for ever from the journalistic landscape.
The last example points out the fact that the theory developed above
about the persistence, or disappearence, of activities through time can be
as well applied to the case of economic commodities. The most spectacular
examples of such disappearances of goods are provided by goods submitted
to fashion, like clothes, perfumes, touristic services, a.s.o. Fashionable
goods generally survive (have a positive demand) as long as the fashion
survives. When a di⁄erent fashion rises, it can take the place of the existing
one which has to disappear.
One should not be too pessimistic however. First, individuals may par-
ticipate simultaneously to several activities (multihoming)1.This opportu-
nity has not been taken into account in our analysis since it is implicitely
supposed here that individuals adhere to a club at the exclusion of the
other. The possibility of double membership should strengthen the prob-
ability of survival of the minorities since participation in the minorities￿
interests does not preclude to share as well the interests for the activities
preferred by the majority. Second, ￿rms or institutions o⁄ering economic
goods or services generating positive network externalities can also develop
several strategies to countervail the superior size of the rivals￿networks. In
a context of price competition between ￿rms, one example of such strate-
gies could be the introduction of price discounts, or even negative prices,
as it has been the case for instance in the European press industry, with a
signi￿cant number of newspapers o⁄ering special gifts to attract readers.
Our model does not take into account the existence of such strategies
since it deals with individual choices operating in a context from which
price competition is absent. Should the clubs impose entry fees to their
members, it would open the door to practises analysed in a static context
1Recent studies have stressed the importance of multihoming in the static context
of price competition with two-sided markets, see Armstrong and Wright (2007) and
Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004).
14by industrial economists interested in networks and two-sided markets (for
an excellent recent survey, see Farrell, J. and P. Klemperer (2007); on two
sided markets in particular, see Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong
(2006)). 2
Finally, the emergence of new fashions does not always entail that the
old ones have to vanish. Their simultaneous presence then enriches the
choice possibility set of the individuals. Such a cohabitation arises when
network externalities which have brought the fashionable objects in light
are not su¢ ciently strong to prevent the birth and the development of
paralell objects or activities, creating and keeping alive their own networks
of fans.
2To our knowledge, the question of minorities￿survival in a context of product dif-
ferentiation, price interaction and lagged network externalities (in both cases of simple
network externalities and cross network externalities) has not been so far addressed.in
a dynamic context. Doganoglu (2003) provides a dynamic framework for the analysis
of price competition in the presence of simple network externalities. Unfortunatly, this
study rules out the possibility of the smaller network￿ s eviction and, consequently, is not
able to provide us any guidance on the questions related to the survival of the minority￿ s
variants in the presence of networks.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 4
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2￿2(￿1 + 2￿2) < 0) ,
, ￿ > 1
￿
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1 ￿ 2￿2 + 2￿￿2
(32)
Accordingly, both clubs survive with a mixte membership if and only if
0 < ￿ < 1 and ￿ <
1
2￿￿2 + 1 ￿ 2￿2
(33)
or







Finally, since we are restricting ourselves to the case of positive external-
ities, the non-negativity constraint over ￿ must be taken into account. In
condition (33),
￿ > 0 ,
,
1
1 ￿ 2￿2 + 2￿￿2
> 0
Always true (￿ > 0)
And condition (33) corresponds to condition (i) in proposition 4.
In condition (34),


















This means that condition (34) has to be re-written as









17,which corresponds to condition (ii) in proposition 4.￿
Proof of proposition 5


















which is possible if and only if the values of the parameters are such that
1







which, according to (31) and (32) only happens when
0 < ￿ < 1
Therefore, club 2 attracts a female membership only if and only if 0 < ￿ < 1
and 1
2￿￿2+1￿2￿2 < ￿ < 1
2￿2￿ ￿
1￿2￿2
2￿2 ; as stated in proposition 5:

















1 ￿ 2￿2 + 2￿￿2








1 ￿ 2￿2 + 2￿￿2
which according to (31) and (32) only happens when
￿ > 1
Moreover, since the ￿rst condition in (37) now imposes a lower threshold
on the parameter ￿; the non-negativity condition on this parameter (con-
dition (35)) is not binding. Therefore, as stated in proposition 5, club 2
survives with a male membership only when ￿ > 1 and 1
2￿2￿ ￿
1￿2￿2
2￿2 < ￿ <
1
1￿2￿2+2￿￿2:￿
Proof of proposition 6



















1 ￿ 2￿2 + 2￿￿2
￿
(39)
Recalling equations (31) and (32), the solutions to inequation (39) are:







￿ > 1 and ￿ >
1
1 ￿ 2￿2 + 2￿￿2
(41)
again, since equation (41) imposes a lower threshold on ￿; the non-negativity
condition (35) is not binding. Condition (40) is condition (i) in proposition
6 and condition (41) is condition (ii) in the same proposition.￿
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